Never will New France cease to bless our great Monarch for undertaking to restore her to life and resue her from the fires of the Iroquois. For nearly forty years we have been sighing for this happiness. Our tears have at length crossed the sea, and our plaint has touched the heart of his Majesty, who is about to make a Kingdom of our Barbarous land, and change our forests into towns and our deserts in Province.
Jesuit Relations, 1664-16651
So echoed the joyous sentiments of both clergyman and habitant alike as the first four companies of the Carignan-Salières Regiment disembarked the Joyeux Siméon that fateful day, June 19th, 1665. Fresh from their campaign against the Turks in Austria and Hungary, their presence in Canada heralded the prospect of a secured and lasting peace with the Five Nations Iroqouis.2
Even Marie de l'Incarnation, that pillar of religious fortitude and piousness, could not help but become caught up in the anticipation of victory which followed their exploits when she wrote that,
Our French soldiers are so fervent they fear nothing, and there is nothing they do not do and undertake . . . It seems to all these soldiers that they are going to beseige paradise, and they hope to capture and enter it, because it is good for the Faith and religion that they are going to do battle.3
Were their hopes unfounded? Certainly, the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières were seasoned veterans, skilled in the art of battlefield warfare. Yet, neither they nor their political leaders could have anticipated either the unconventional military tactics used by the natives to defend themselves, or the tremendous difficulty the climactic and geographic conditions of New France would present.
To use these hopes as a precursor to sucess, as some modern scholars and historians have done, does little justice to the truth; that, despite having met most of its political objectives, from a military point of view, the Carignan expeditions of 1666 should be considered a failure which resulted in numerous if not unwarranted casualties.
The idea of a strong colonial and economic presence in Canada was not always foremost in the minds of French authorities. Unsuccessful in the few colonial endeavors attempted in the 1660's, and increasingly distracted by domestic issues, France had begun to lag behind both Spain and England in the devlopment of its New World resources.
With the appointment of Jean-Baptiste Colbert as Comtroleur-Générale, however, a new attitude would prevail in the Royal Courts of France, that of mercantilism. More of a theory than a recipe for economic success, mercantilism held that the world contained only a finite amount of wealth, and that one's share of this wealth could only be increased at the expense on another's. In order to decrease France's dependance upon foreign made goods, Colbert concluded that it was necessary to close her borders to international trade and nurture the seemly endless resources of New France.
By May of 1664, Louis XIV made a number of changes to the political structure of New France. Having first revoked the private fur trading monopoly of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, he granted this charter instead to the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, which fell under direct government supervision; secondly, he established the Conseil Souvrain at Quebec to administer the colony within definitive guidlines set forth by himself; lastly, he appointed Alexandre de Prouville, Marquis de Tracy, as his new Lieutenant-General, to oversee the establishment of a governmental infrastructure, which included the use of a standing army.
The last would prove critical to Colbert's plans, for he realized that the one real obstacle which stood between peace and prosperity for New France were the Iroquois. It was with this in mind that he informed Bishop Laval: "His Majesty has resolved to send a good regiment of infantry to Canada at the end of this year, or in the month of February next, in order to destroy these barbarians completely."4
The good regiment of infantry refered to by Colbert was, of course, the Carignan-Salières. Formed in 1658 as an amalgamation of two existing regiments, the Carignan-Salières compried twenty companies of fifty men each, and was commanded by Colonel Henri de Chastelard, Marquis de Salières.5
Despite his relative stature within the regiment, de Salières authority while in Canada was relegated to that of third in command, beneath both de Tracey and Daniel de Rémy de Courcelles, the newly appointed Governor of New France: "In keeping with the custom of the kingdom, M. de Courcelles shall command all of the troops who will be situated in the range of his government."6
De Salières would not have been completely out of line in objecting to this unprecedented subordination of his command position. A veteran of the Thirty Years War, he had already proven himself a capable field commander. His knowledge and skill in European warfare was equivalent, if not superior to de Tracey's. Above all, having been appointed directly by the King, military custom decreed that de Salières was responsible to him alone for his conduct, and that of his men.
In defence of de Courcelles, the King rarely exhibited direct control over his armies. Most of the orders issued by Louis XIV were made in consultation with his Minister of War, Le Tellier, to whom de Salières already reported. No doubt realizing the serious limitations that would have been imposed upon a Canadian campaign, Louis XIV had every right to authorize the Governor and de Tracey to represent him there.
Expected to last only eighteen months, the successful deployment of French troops in Canada served two major political objectives: to secure the colony from the ravages of continuous Iroquios attack, and, upon completion, to "invite the soldiers of the Carignan Regiment . . . to remain in the country by giving them a small gratuity, in the name of His Majesty, to provide them with more of the means needed to establish themselves there."7
One of the first measures taken by de Tracey upon his arrival was the fortification of the Richelieu Valley. Realizing the strategic importance of the valley, controlling its interior served a dual purpose: to secure the main transportation route leading into Mohawk territory should an expedition become necessary;8 and conversely, to deny the Mohawk access to the settlements along the St. Lawrence River.9
Lacking skilled workmen and proper tools, the task of clearing land and erecting palisaeds was excruciating work. It was made all the more difficult by the fact that few men, de Salières included, possessed the knowledge required to construct a defensive position of this nature. This ignorance was not just confined to the construction of military fortifications. Although skilled in the European style of open warfare, the French were woefully unprepared for the type of fighting employed by the natives. Termed petit-guerre, or little war, their use of stealth and small raiding parties in a restrictive and constantly changing Canadian environment, combined with an almost rythmic style of movement during attack would prove an interesting counterpoint to what was clearly a superior French force.
To make matters worse, several of de Salières party had contracted the flu, "caused by the great rains, cold, and for having poor jackets, naked feet, and for not having cooking pots to make their lard and to make a little soup."10 In all likelihood, de Salières conveyed some sense of the hardships his men were experiencing to de Courcelles upon the occasion of the governor's inspection in October, 1665. Rightfully believing that he would form part of the planning process should an expedition be undertaken, such information would have proven critical to its success or failure.
From de Tracey's perspective, however, securing the colony did not necessarily preclude open warfare with the Iroquois. Even as de Courcelles was reconnoitering the area around Lake Champlain, the King's General was expending a considerable amount of time and effort in negotiating a peace settlement with the Five Nations. Indeed, it appeared as though de Tracey only considered the use of force as a last resort.11 There was, according to Marie de l'Incarnation, a certain degree of sincerity to his efforts: "He has done all he can to win them over by kindness, but they are brutes that would not let themselves be conquered by the charm that wins all those that have any remnant of reason."12
As talks progressed, however, it became increasingly clear that not all of the Iroquois nations were responsible for the numerous attacks upon Canadian settlements. The Mohawk were conspicuously absent from Quebec during the summer of 1665, signally both their defience of French auth14 Their objective was simple: to destroy the Iroquios villiages along the Mohawk Valley of lower New York, and so compel them to join the French at the bargaining table. Yet, two problems arose almost immediately: Firstly, none of the Algonkin, who were to act as guides and hunters for the French, had arrived at Fort St. Louis; Secondly, the weather had deteriorated to such a degree in the days leading up to the rendezvous that safe travel became all but impossible.
It is indeed ironic that many of the problems encountered by de Salières only three months previously were again beginning to plague the French. With de Salières having returned to Montreal on urgent business, however, de Courcelles was left free to act upon his own discretion.
Why did the military aspects of the expedition fail so miserably? The answer lies in de Courcelle's insistence, against the advise of his own people, to wage a winter campaign against the Mohawk Nation.15 It is he who decided to continue the journey, despite the cold, and without the aid of their native allies to navigate them through unfriendly lands and supply them with food.
The effects of this ill concieved decision upon the common soldier can never be truly understood. They were heavily burdened, and ill equiped for their long overland journey. As a result, travel was slow, conspicuous, and contributed to their already weakened and demoralized state:
it was necessary to march three hundred leagues in snow; to cross repeatedly lakes and rivers on the ice, with the danger of falling at every astep; to make one's bed on nothing but snow, in the heart of the woods; and to endure cold far exceeding the severity of the hardest winters in Europe.16
While it is true that few of the soldiers of the Carignan Regiment could have conceived of such hardships, to say that "It is impossible to give any idea of the extraordinary difficulty he [de Courcelles] had on this journey on account of the lack of experience of our French soldiers at the time" is simply not a fair assessment of the situation.17 More so the reverse seems true, that the difficulties experienced by the French soldiers and volunteers were a direct result of de Courcelles' inexperience as a field commander.
The events that followed have been well chronicled. One February 20, 1666, three weeks having passed since their departure from Fort St. Louis, de Courcelles and his party encountered a number of Indian cabins located upon the outskirts of the Anglo-Dutch settlement of Schenectady. Mistaking the settlement for a Mohawk village, he ordered an assult which resulted in the death of three old women. All were unarmed.
Having aroused the curiousity of a Mohawk trading party in the vicinity, a melée ensued in which seven of the French were killed to only four Mohawk. More casualties would have resulted had not the Burgomaster of Schenectady personally intervened, advising de Courcelles that his forces had strayed into English territory.
Given the recent conduct of his men, and not wanting to provoke the large English garrison located at nearby Albany, de Courcelles withdrew his forces. Before departing, however, he was able, albeit at considerable expense, to replenish his army for the long journey home. No sooner had the French departed Schenectady than were they joined by those Algonkin who were to have guided them on their expedition. In spite of their tardiness, their arrival most certainly saved a number of soldiers from cold and starvation.
The expedition was completed on March 8, 1666 with the return of de Courcelles and his men to Fort St. Louis.18 There is a good deal of debate concerning the actual number of casualties sustained by the French during the expedition of 1665-1666. On the one hand, historians Regis Roy and Benjamin Sulte report only 60 casualties out of a total force of approximately 500 soldiers and volunteers. Their information, however, is most likely drawn from Jesuit accounts, which in turn may have been deliberately underscored so as to present an illusion of, in the least, a partial victory.19
On the other hand, François de Tapis, Captain of the Poitou Company, presented an altogether different account, claiming that "on this expedition which we undertook in the month of January we lost four hundred men who dropped dead from cold while on the march."20 This source seems the more reliable for two reasons; his estimate was based upon his personal observations of the events at hand, and form part of his personal journal, which were not meant to be published, and so contain few of the biases that might be contained in 'official' accounts. If this latter figure is accurate, it implies that almost 70% of the combined strength of soldiers and volunteers who particpated in the winter campaign perished under de Courcelle's command.
Sulte suggests that, despite the failure of the winter campaign, de Courcelles convinced himself that his presence in the face of the enemy, in the middle of winter, would have made a strong impression upon the Mohawk nation.21 In fact, the Mohawk were not so easily impressed, for the spring of 1666 had brought about a resumption in both Iroquois attacks upon French settlements along the St. Lawrence Valley, and peace talks aimed at ending them.
Some progress was made, with the signing of the Mutual Friendship Treaties in early July of that year. Even as preparations were being made to address the Onondaga and Mohawk tribes, however, word arrived at Quebec of yet another Iroquois attack, this time upon Fort Ste. Anne, which was just nearing completion at the base of Lake Champlain. In all, seven men were reported killed. Among the prisoners taken in the raid was Lt. Louis de Canchy de Lerole, a cousin of de Tracy.
There is reasonable suspicion to assume, and it is certain that de Tracy believed that the English at New York were is some way directing the Mohawk effort against the French. This could only have been reinforced with word, in October of 1666, that England and France were again at war with eachother. To continue negotiations with the Iroquois now seemed moot, for any treaties negotiated would be dependant upon the English at NewYork remaining neutral, which was entirely doubtful: "They [the Mohawk] should not be trusted. It would be far better to make war on them than to make an unreliable peace."22
With regard to the English, the King instructed de Tracy to persue one of two options: either make war with them , or secure their neutrality. Since any peace overature with the Mohawk or English would expose the French to attack by the other, de Tracy had little alternative but to attempt to destroy both.
This course of action was greeted quite favorably within the colony. As Intendent Talon advised de Tracy, "the defeat of the Mohawks would open up the way for invading New York."23 The motives for such a venture, however, appear to be as nationalistic in nature, however, as they were political; in spite of its practicle limitations, Marie de l'Incarnation argued that "if New Holland, which is today occupied by the English, belonged to the King of France, we would be master of all these peoples, and would make a wonderful French colony there."24
Preparations for the second expedition into Mohawk territory began in earnest in September of 1666. One hundred and fifty-two canoes were constructed, and a large number of muskets and ammunition was provided to the approximately 1,300 men -- comprising 600 soldiers, 600 volunteers and 100 native allies -- who would converge upon Fort Ste.-Anne on the 28th of that month.
The campaign was conceived and led almost exclsuively by de Tracy. Hoping to avoid the pitfalls experienced by de Courcelles the previous winter, de Tracy's strategy was to make every use of the resources at his disposal, and to minimize the adverse effects of both climate and geography. Applying some of the object lessons learned from their previous encounters with the Iroquois, de Tracy was relying upon the element of surprise to take the Mohawk villages that lay just on the other side of the Adirondack Mountains.
Discovered by an enemy hunty party, however, de Tracy was compelled to abandon his silent approach in favour of an accelerated advance. By doing so, he resolved to cut off an avenue of retreat and so force an open confrontation with the Mohawk.
On the evening of October 15th, de Tracy ordered a night march but, upon his arrival the following day, found that all four villages in the Mohawk valley had been deserted. Having abandoned most of their provisions and all of their food stocks, the natives there had obviously left in considerable haste. Unable to summon either their English or Confederate allies in time to meet the French, they had concluded that it was far better to retreat with nothing but their lives than to face certain defeat.
The fact that the campaign had failed to accomplish a tactical defeat of the Mohawk tribe did not prevent de Tracy from exacting a small measure of discomfort upon them by ordering the destruction of their villages. Certainly, it was not the victory that de Tracy had envisioned, but the effects were similar. If he could not have their lives in battle, perhaps he could take them through pestilence and famine:
The season is too far advanced for them to rebuild their villages. The little grain that remains from the firing of their crops will not be enough to nourish them, they being to the number of three thousand. If they go to the other nations, they will not be received for fear of causing famine; and besides, the other nations would scorn them because they have prevented them from making peace with the French.25
Whatever his ambitions against the English might have been, de Tracy's first goal was to subdue the Iroquois. Failing this, and keeping in mind the losses sustained by de Courcelles during the winter campaign, were he to confront the English at that point, he would risk a considerable loss of both men and equipment. This would have left the Canadian hinterland virtually indistinguishable to further enemy incursions. Considering that his primary objective was to secure the colony from Iroquois attack, it is completely understandable that de Tracy would decline an invasion of the English settlements along the valley, and so return to Canada.
This marks the end of the Carignan campaigns in North America. Although they would winter two more years, there were no further incidents of such widespread repute. The few skirmishes that did occur were isolated, and involved few men or casualties.
Recalling that one of the original objectives of Colbert was to settle some of the more willing soldiers within the colony, Intendent Talon did succeed in convincing at least 450 to stay upon the Regiment's departure in 1668. Some seem to have been attracted by the offer of free land and provisions, and others by the prospect of making their fortune in the fur trade. Many would eventually marry the filles de roi, or the King's daughters, and settle upon the vast seigneurial tracts of their superior officers. Among the more prominent grantees were de Sorel, and de la Varrennes, of whom cities now bare their names.
It has been written that "in all history there can hardly be found a march of more difficulty or greater length that of this little army; and it needed French courage and Monsieur de Courcelle's firmness to undertake it."26 Such observations, however, have only served to reinforce the Carignan-Salières myth. While many of these Jesuit accounts are descriptive and contain information that is, for the most part, accurate, there is a definite bias in their narration of the negative aspects and implications of the Reginent's expeditions.
Given these perceptions, some French-Canadian historians such as Roy have been quick to suggest that the history of the Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada is the history of Quebec itself; many of the characteristic traits that can be found in the soldiers of the day -- nobility, generosity, bravery -- have been passed down from generation to generation, and permeates through much of what is now called nationistis Quebec society.27
Yet, there is no single ideology that guided the Regiment's being. The leaders of these two Carignan campaigns were as diverse in character as the objectives they sought to achieve: de Tracy, who was considered by many to be a strong military leader, valued peace above all else; de Salières, who often deferred to the side of caution, was continually disregarded by his superiors; and de Courcelles, whose desire to wage war was overshadowed only by his own ineptitude. So which of these three men is Roy trying to portray?
There is little doubt that the arrival of the Carignan-Salières Regiment in 1666 signaled a turning point in French Colonial affairs. Without their intervention, New France would most certainly have fallen victim to the successive onslaught of English and Iroquois raiding parties.
Success or failure, however, can not be so easily measured. While some political objectives were achieved, clearly others were not. And while some were achieved quickly, with minimal resistance, others took a considerable amount of time and achieved little. From a military perspective, the Iroquois nations had been subdued, but at the enormous cost of French lives. This is hardly the victory that modern historians would like to portray. To suggest, then, that a sigle regiment of some 1,200 men could play an even larger role in developing the colonial consciousness of French Canada would seem equally fallacious.
1 Reuban Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (Cleveland: Burrows Bros. Co., 1896-1901), Vol. 49, p. 213.
2 Benjamin Sulte, Le Régiment de Carignan (Montrèal: G. Ducharme, 1922), p. 25.
3 Marie de l'Incarnation to her son, Claude Martin, October 16, 1666: Joyce Marshall, ed., Word From New France, the Selected Letters of Marie de l'Incarnation (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 317-318.
4 Colbert to Laval, 18 Mar 1664: Archives du Séminaire de Quèbec, Lettres, carton N, no. 14, in Jack Vernay,The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada 1665-1668 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1991), p. 3; Benjamin Sulte, Carignan, p. 10.
5 "État des troupes d'infantries de l'armie d'Italie, contenan la reduction et reformation": NAC, MG4, B1, Series A1, Vol. 154, p. 65V.
6 Le Tellier, Minister of War to de Salières, 19 Apr 1665: NAC, MG4, B1, Series A1, Vol. 192, p. 291.
7 Louis XIV to Jean Talon, Intendant of New France, "Mèmoire de Roy pour servir d'instruction au sieur Talon s'en allant Intendant de la Justice, police et finances dans la Nouvelle France", 27 Mar 1665: NAC, MG5, B1, Vol. 5, pp. 197-198.
8 Talon to Colbert, 10 Oct 1665: ibid., pp. 213-214.
9 Louis XIV to Talon, 27 Mar 1665: ibid., p. 186.
10 "Mèmoire de M. de Salières des Choses qui se sont passes en Canada les plus considerables depuis qu'il est arrivè": NAC, MG7, IA2, p. 3.
12 Marie de l'Incarnation to Claude Martin, 16 Oct 1666: Marshall, Word, p. 317.
14 Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, pp. 135; Nicolas Perrot, Mèmoire sur les Moeurs (Leipzig and Paris: A. Franck, 1864), p. 111.
15 Sulte, Carignan, pp. 39-40.
16 Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, p. 133.
17 Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 49, p. 163.
18 Sulte, Carignan, p. 47; W.J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 1663-1701 (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1964), p. 41.
19 Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, p. 183.
20 François de Tapie, "Le Livre de raison de François de Tapie de Monteil, Capitaine au regiment de Poitou (1661-1670)", in Revue d'histoire de l'Amèrique française, Vol. 14, no. 1, 1960, p. 112.
22 Jean Talon to the Marquis de Tracy, 01 Sep 1666, NAC, CIIA, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 312. Talon suggests a number of reasons for and against the invasion of the Mohawk valley. De Tracy's reply appears as a marginal comment of this document.
24 Marie de l'Incarnation to Claude Martin, 18 Oct 1667, in Marshall, Word, p. 330.
25 Marie de l'Incarnation to one of the Ursuline Sisters, 02 Nov 1666, in Marshall, Word, p. 325.
26 Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 50, p. 133.
27 Regis Roy, Le Régiment de Carignan (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1925), pp. 46-47.