Revolutionary agitation channels, incorporates and organizes popular discontent. The aims of systematic agitation are to gather the revolutionaries together to prepare them for direct action and also to show that we intend to overthrow the established authorities at all costs and will go on to the end; like it or not, the enemy will have to accept the verdict.
P.-A. Gauthier (pseudonym), April 30, 19641
Was the kidnapping of British trade envoy James Cross, and Québec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte by the separatist Front de Liberation du Québec in October of 1970 a prelude to revolution? Certainly there were many in government who thought so; Jean Marchant, Minister of Regional Economic Expansion in Trudeau's cabinet, called the FLQ "a state within the state that must be disorganized now."2 Labour Minister Bryce Mackasey, in considering the release of FLQ prisoners as one of the terms of the surrender of Cross and Laporte, speculated that "if by not helping the Québec government we were to destroy it, there was no doubt that civil war would follow".3 Even Trudeau would concede that "These persons allege that they are seeking change through novel means. In fact they are seeking the destruction of the social order through clandestine and violent means."4
While Ottawa was by no means in a state of panic, it was generally perceived by authorities that the FLQ was well armed, and quite capable of the sort of violence that they had been advocating since the early 1960's. The kidnappings of Cross on October 5th, and Laporte one week later were certainly evidence of this, and suggested an alarming if not "well organized escalation" in their terrorist tactics.5 What had long been tolerated as a thorn in the side of Québec liberalism had suddenly become, at least in Premier Bourassa's estimation, "a concerted effort to intimidate and overthrow the government and the democratic institutions of this province".6
Given Trudeau's renewed sense of sovereignty, and his year old commitment to reorganizing Canada's defence priorities to fit that image, there was no question that the federal government had "an obligation to come to the aid of the civil power".7 But by invoking the War Measures Act, was the purpose in utilizing so many ground troops as overt as Cabinet would have the public believe, for the "protection of public buildings so that the police could be used for other duties"?8 In spite of overwhelming public support for his actions, there are some, such as political and historical commentator J.L. Granatstein, who argue that Trudeau's use of force in dealing with the FLQ was motivated by a personal desire "to crush the separatist movement" altogether.9
While several authors have detailed the efforts of both government and the FLQ during the October crisis, the idea that "the armed forces might become a hidden tool of repression for the government" has not been adequately explored these past twenty-five years.10 Indeed, the failure of government sources to expand upon their decision, in addition to having widened the gap between these two divergent schools of opinion, has fueled speculation that Trudeau may have been acting upon a hidden agenda. Given what has been revealed, a closer examination of the evidence and issues at hand appears warranted.
One point that is continually raised is whether the FLQ ever did pose a reasonable threat to Canadian sovereignty. It is clear, at least from perspective of their own published propaganda, that the FLQ were determined to incite a revolution between French Québec and English Canada. Yet, according to their own words, they did not consider themselves true terrorists, but merely the instruments of "enthusiasm and impatience for liberation".11 These were rather noble sentiments for such a well-organized group, capable of unprecedented acts of violence in the pursuit of their separatist cause.
While the FLQ had existed in name as early as 1963, few originating members could claim any ideological connection to the present strain. It was not until the emergence of an embittered Pierre Vallières in 1965 that they would evolve into the threat that they represented in October of 1970. Unlike his mercenary predecessors, it was he who steered a clear course towards the left, championing the working class, and attacking the beourgoisis elite of Québec:
The FLQ is necessary in order to meet the violence of the present system with revolutionary violence and to construct a new society, a free society, free from colonialism, exploitation and fear. Revolutionary activity is not only planting bombs or taking up a gun, but working at the same time to radicalize trade unions, citizens committees, student associations etc.12
Terrorism, however, was but one of the tools at their disposal. Having clearly caught both provincial and federal authorities off guard, their ability to sway public support, including the powerful Confederation of National Trade Unions executive committee chaired by Michel Chartrand, appeared to pose an even greater threat than the kidnappings themselves. As much as they were considered a physical danger to the sovereignty of Canada, the FLQ most certainly presented a ideological threat to the well-being of Québec society and the well-orchestrated plans of Bourassa and Trudeau to strengthen French Canadian ties to the rest of the Canada.13
What most concerned Trudeau was that their influence was not necessarily confined to students and socialists. By all accounts, the FLQ were even making an impression amongst some of the intellectual elite of the province. A letter to the editor of La Presse, dated October 14th and signed by such notable Qu‚b‚cois as Ren‚ L‚vesque and Claude Ryan, urged a negotiated settlement for the release of Cross and Laporte, including the recognition of several of the FLQ's key demands. This, of course, ran counter to the government's official position, and strengthened their belief that the FLQ might soon incite the entire populace of Montreal and Québec:
The population was already being excited by people such as [Michel] Chartrand and [Robert] Lemieux, and there would be a real danger of the movement gaining many converts, resulting in the creation of a popular movement. In order to prevent such a development, it would be necessary for the government to act before it lost the power to act.14
A weak response by either government in this matter could conceivably have validated the FLQ's position and their growing popularity amongst those who saw them as a voice of change. That this crisis had "begun to cause a lot of irrational behavior among people I had assumed to be more rational" would indicate, at least from Trudeau's perspective, that the FLQ did present an apprehended threat to Canadian sovereignty.15
The War Measures Act, proclaimed by Cabinet in the early hours of October 16th, granted wide sweeping powers to the government of Québec to deal with FLQ sympathizers. While in theory the act did allow for the search and seizure of anyone in the province suspected of having ties to the outlawed organization, in practice authorities did not merely restrict themselves to armed insurrectionists. A number of Front d'action politique members, for instance, were included in their initial sweeps, begging charges that Bourassa was using the October crisis as a means of swaying public support against their separatist cause in advance of the Montreal municipal elections of October 25th. Trudeau, of course, has consistently denied any allegation of governmental intervention in the legitimate separatist movement.16 This hardly explains, however, his decision to employ the use of troops, nor does it address the question of whether the military was able to play a viable role in reducing the threat posed by the illegal separatist movement.
At least two military operations were initiated by the events in Québec:17 Operation Ginger, which deployed throughout the National Capital Region from October 12th to November 21st, involved an estimated 500 to 1000 troops from 2 Combat Group, Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. As "peace agents" their job was directed primarily in relieving the R.C.M.P. so that "the police be more free to do their job as policemen and not spend their time guarding . . . against some form of kidnapping."18
Operational Order No. 2, the basis of all initial taskings assigned to the approximately 5,000 to 6,000 francophone military personnel involved in Operation Essay, directed the Canadian Armed Forces to participate "in a symbolic show of force against the FLQ without antagonizing the rest of the province of Québec."19 Specifically, it called for the protection of public property, including symbols of provincial and federal authority, the creation of a well-publicized mobile reserve, and the air reconnaissance of ground locations where the FLQ were suspected of hiding.20 Subordinate operations known to have been undertaken by the military included the monitoring of the events leading up the Montreal municipal elections, the disposal of explosives ordinance, and the evacuation of Laporte's killers to Cuba.21
Military commanders were eager to become more involved in the overall operation, requesting at one point a participatory role in the actual sweeps of suspected areas. Given the adequacy of their training in low intensity conflict, especially in relation to peacekeeping duties, Canadian soldiers would have seemed the ideal choice to deal with an internal security crisis. Provincial authorities, however, offered them only limited involvement in cordon and search operations. Even then, upon only one occasion was such a search "conducted in the face of hostile or potentially hostile elements. The test was more of the organizational ability of the forces involved rather than their operational ability."22 That they were restricted altogether from conducting house-to-house searches is further indication of the tight leash under which the military was being held during this operation.23
Whether this had been Trudeau's intention all along -- to demonstrate "a show of strength in major population centers, predominately Montreal" rather than the use of force -- would lead at least one commentator to maintain that "from a military operational standpoint, the October Crisis was singularly uneventful."24 In the final analysis, even military sources would concede that the bulk of these troops played only a passive role in the FLQ crisis.25
Author Brian Cuthbertson argues that this was quite typical for that type of situation. While provincial authorities routinely request military aid to civil power, they do so less for their concievable firepower than for other non-military resources and skills, such as manpower, mobility, communication, and an organized command structure.26 From the military's point of view, such a conflict in purpose would only have intensified their confusion as to what Trudeau actually meant by 'defence of sovereignty'.27 Despite their many unique qualifications, few politicians could risk putting military forces in a position that would have exceeded their mandate.
Given the apparent contradiction between Trudeau's intention to 'immobilize' the FLQ, and the deliberately restrained deployment of troops, was the FLQ the true object of his attention? While few would link Trudeau's internalization of Canada's defence priorities to the impending separatist crisis in Québec, against a growing tide of popular support for Québec independence the FLQ may have unwittingly provided the federal government, and Trudeau, with the motive to respond.28 While this is a far cry from Granatstein's assertion that federalist forces, including the military, were actively engaged in counter-separatism, Trudeau must have been well aware of the confusion in public perception between these two groups before acting against the one.
Parti Québecois leader Ren‚ L‚vesque may have found solace is his middle of the road position towards the FLQ, however, authorities were quick to point out the many inconsistencies in his politics: In no small measure supportive of terrorist means to achieve a sovereign Québec nation, he was amongst the most vocal of Québec politicians to suggest a negotiated settlement of the FLQ crisis; At the same time denouncing the assassination of Laporte, he laments that the actions of the FLQ "can be explained".29
Of course, every effort was made publicly to downplay the connection between the two movements. Minister Mackasey, for instance, made a point of stating in the House of Commons that the Parti Québecois was "a legitimate, political party. It wants to bring an end to this country through democratic means, but that is the privilege of that party."30 Trudeau is much more to the point when he states that, even if government were to able to eliminate the root of violence in that province, Québec would still separate, for "That is what they want."31
Others were not so reticent in their understanding of the relationship between the various organizations within the separatist movement: M.P. Ovide Laflamme, for one, stated publicly that "The objectives seeked [sic] by the FLQ and the Parti Québecois are identical; only the means to reach them differ."32 Even in private, their is ample indication that government officials believed that the FLQ and Québec separatism were invariably tied: "Several Ministers expressed concern at the apparent readiness of persons in authority in the [broadcast] networks to make their facilities available to Separatists and FLQ supporters."33
Did government conspire to defeat the separatist movement within Québec, or were these merely the utterances of those who lacked a better understanding of the situation? Whatever their reasoning, it is rather unlikely that Trudeau, by employing military forces, intended anything other than aid to civil authority. In hindsight, the use of so many troops to quash what is now considered a small and ineffective organization seems questionable. Given the circumstances, however, "The governments [of Québec and Canada] could not on any pretext regard these new acts or aggressions by the FLQ as an isolated phenomenon."34 From all appearances, the FLQ presented as real a threat to public order as the Montreal Police strike did only twelve months earlier.
The crisis which followed Trudeau's efforts to reprioritize National Defence objectives was not a self fulfilling prophecy. As evidenced by their small part in the whole affair, the Canadian military could hardly be accused of arresting the separatist movement. This is not to say, however, that their presence was not used to obvious advantage. Partially in an effort to reaffirm Bourassa's wavering position, Trudeau's decision to use military troops involved much more than the protection of persons and property, but was calculated to deliver a 'psychological shock' -- obviously to Québec in general, for this is where the bulk of troops were eventually sent, but more importantly to those in that province who supported the separatist movement, armed or otherwise.
An upsurge in terrorist activity in the fall of 1971 rekindled the possibility of having to invoke emergency powers. It was roundly opposed, however, suggesting that both government and public alike would not tolerate the habit of using a hammer to crush a flea. As Trudeau himself contends, "the state must use force only to the extent that individuals or organizations try to use it themselves against the common good. If it is true that in the last analysis the state must retain the monopoly of force, the purpose is less to use it than to prevent someone else from usurping the thunderbolts."35 Given that they were already on the verge of extinction, the FLQ posed less of a threat to Canadian soveriegnty than they ever did in 1970, and much less than would be required to test again Thor's retribuation.
1 La Cogn‚e, No. 10, April 30, 1964. P.-A. Gauthier (pseudonym) explains the second of three stages of revolution.
2 Canada, Privy Council Office, Cabinet Minutes, 60-70, October 15, 1970, p. 4.
3 Cabinet Minutes, 61-70, October 15, 1970, p. 3.
4 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. I, October 16, 1970, p. 194.
5 Toronto Star, October 12, 1970, p. 8. Pierre Laporte to Pierre Trudeau, October 11, 1970.
6 Debates, October 16, 1970, p. 193. Robert Bourassa to Pierre Trudeau, October 16, 1970. Request for aid to civil power.
7 Toronto Star, April 5, 1969, p. 12. Trudeau had determined to reshape military policy in the image of his federalist predecessors who viewed military interests more as an extension of national interests than of foreign policy. In a radical departure from former Defence Minister Hellier's stance only five years earlier, Trudeau long awaited policy statement, printed in its entirety, made clear his intentions: "Canada requires armed forces within Canada in order to carry out a wide range of activities involving the defence of the country, also supplementing the civil authorities and contributing to national development."; Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 28th Parliament, 2nd Session, No. 16, p. 10. Statement by the Hon. L‚o Cadieux, MND, March 3, 1970. During subsequent questioning, he reiterates the governments position by stating that "the [armed] forces have to react to a request from an attorney general of a province. We do not question his request."
8 Cabinet Minutes, 60-70, October 15, 1970, p. 2. Statement by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
9 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, "Defence in the Seventies: Comments on the White paper", in Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXX, No. 7-8, Oct 1971, p. 12.
10 Louis Fournier, F.L.Q. Histoire d'un mouvement clandestin (Montr‚al: Québec/ Am‚rique, 1982), Ron Haggart, and Golden, Aubrey E, Rumours of War (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1979), and G‚rald Pelletier, The October Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971) immediately come to mind. Perhaps the best secondary evaluation of the role of the military during the crisis can be found in Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977), Chapter 8; Quote from "Defence in the Seventies", p. 9. The release of the 1971 White Paper on Defence, which reiterated many of the changes in defence policy announced in 1969, occasioned at least one M.P., Progressive Conservative John Forrestall (Dartmouth-Halifax East), to comment on the direction in which he saw Canadian military forces moving.
11 Louis Nadeau (pseudonym), La Cogn‚e, No. 12, May 31, 1964.
12 Haggart and Golden, Rumours, p. 134. Interview with Peter Allnutt of the CBC, July, 1970.
13 Canada, Privy Council Office, Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 4-70, 14 Oct 1970, p. 3. An address by Charles Drury, President of the Treasury Board, suggested that the government may in fact "be losing the war with the FLQ". While physical repression might do well to combat the FLQ, other alternatives would have to be considered in order to reverse the psychological damage inflicted upon the populace.
14 C.C.S.I. Minutes, October 14, 1970, p. 3. Address by Pierre Trudeau.
15 Pierre E. Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), p. 139.
17 Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, 78/219, Chap. 4, p. 30. Considered to be the official history of the October Crisis from the military's perspective, this manuscript, written in 1978 by historian Maj. John Dendy, is still classified as secret. An unclassified version of this report states that a third operation, Operation Night Hawk, was conducted between October 7th and 9th as a "covert deployment of troops into the Montreal area before the beginning of Operation Essay". While military sources remain silent even today as to the purpose and extent of this operation, the dates themselves, which correspond roughly with the first of the two kidnappings, would suggest that the military may have been involved in a clandestine search for James Cross.
18 Toronto Star, October 14, 1970, p. 9. Reprinted in full, this ad-lib interview with Trudeau, conducted by the CBC's Tim Rolfe on the steps of Parliament Hill the previous evening, evoked strong sympathy for government both inside and outside of Canada.
19 D Hist, 78/219, Chap. 3, p. 74.
20 C.C.S.I. Minutes, 5-70, 14 Oct 1970, p. 6. This outline was presented to Committee by Lt.-Gen. M.R. Dare, Vice Chief of Defence Staff.
21 D Hist, 78/219, Chap. 4, p. 20-21.
22 D Hist, 78/219, Chap. 4, p. 24.
23 C.C.S.I. Minutes, 4-70, October 14, 1970, p. 4. Donald MacDonald, Minister of National Defence, briefly considered the idea of using the military to assist in conducting searches, but concluded that it would be inappropriate for them to participate directly in that role.
24 C.C.S.I. Minutes, 4-70, 14 Oct 1970, p. 7. A general discussion of the action to be taken if their October 15th deadline for the safe surrender of Cross and Laporte was not met; David A. Charters, "From October to Oka: Peacekeeping in Canada, 1970-1990", in Marc Milner, ed., Canadian Military History (Toronto: Copp-Clark-Pitman, 1993), p. 377.
25 D Hist, 78/219, Chap. 2, p. 86.
26 Cuthbertson, Military Independance, p. 250.
27 Robert Bothwell, and J.L. Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 236.
28 Kingston Whig-Standard, Monday, April 7, 1969, p. 4. An editorial in this edition provides at least one criticism of Trudeau's reprioritization: while "it is certain that Mr. Trudeau had this contingency [separatism] in mind . . . it would be impossible for him to mention it in public."
29 La Presse, November 9, 1970, p. 6.
30 Debates, October 17, 1970, p. 253.
31 Debates, October 6, 1970, p. 200.
32 Debates, October 17, 1970, p. 260.
33 C.C.S.I. Minutes, 7-70, 16 Oct 1970, p. 2.
34 Pelletier, October Crisis, pp. 81,83.
35 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Approaches to Politics (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 77.