Your oaths, your religion, lay upon you the unavoidable duty of defending your country and your King with all the strength you possess.
Bishop Briand, 17761
Historians have debated, often with considerable vigor, the various reasons for Canada's refusal to join the American colonies in their fight for independence. While most acknowledge the importance of the Quebec Act of 1774 in having divided public opinion, not all are in agreement as to its immediate impact. Burt, for example, contends that American forces alienated rather than ignited the Canadian population, and posed little military threat to the British, despite the limited success of their campaign in Quebec.2 Ouellet, on the other hand, is rooted in the social perspective when he argues that both seigneurs and clergy played a fundamental role in quelling any potential dissension amongst the Canadian lower classes.3 What is lacking in either of these positions, and what is only touched upon briefly by Neatby, is an assessment of the expectations of both the American invaders and their potential Canadian allies.4
From Washington's viewpoint, Canada was ripe for rebellion. Not only was the Quebec Act looked upon as a direct attack upon American affairs of state, but as a deliberate intrusion upon Canada's existing social order. While they would have welcomed any support that might have been offered by its French inhabitants, Brigadiers Montgomery and Arnold expected only that they remain neutral while "old England and the Colonies fight it out".5 As their own problems began to mount, and it became clear that Canadian support was not forthcoming, they were ill prepared, both psychologically and logistically, for a prolonged engagement against a clearly superior British army.
The Canadians, on the other hand, whether in support of the Quebec Act or not, could not be expected to support a losing cause, regardless of what the "Defence of our Liberty, our Property; our Wives and our Children" might have promised them.6 Unlike the revolutionary forces sweeping the English speaking colonies, they were not about to abandon their existing liberties without first assessing whether what they were being asked to embrace was both better and more durable than what the British themselves had only recently conceded.
In this sense, they were much more than what Burt would describe as passive participants, to the point where loyalty flowed "with the apparent tide of victory".7 They were a dynamic force, acting in full knowledge of the apparent risks involved in allying with an unknown, untried, and unpopular army. That the American invasion should eventually fail for want of currency or fair treatment of their Canadian neighbours is irrelavent to understanding the complex relationship that existed between these two provincial forces. What is of significance is the fact that their preoccupation with Britain seriously undermined any expectation of allegiance that either side might have hoped to form with each other.
America's justification for having invaded Quebec in the first place seemed practical enough. Knowing that Britain would not be in a position to respond militarily to its decision to raise an army until the following spring, Washington concluded that a pre-emptive move on Quebec during the summer of 1775 might prevent the British from using the St. Lawrence-Hudson River corridor as a campaign front.8 With Carleton having just sent half of his forces to Boston in support of General Gage, there might not have been any better opportunity to strike at this strategically vital area.
Washington was convinced, in large part upon the advice of the English-Protestant merchants of Montreal, that the Canadians would support an American occupation, and aid in the ouster of the British garrison at Quebec. One such merchant and leader, Thomas Walker, claimed that "the bulk of the people, both English and Canadians . . . wish well your cause", and that "few in this colony dare vent their griefs but groan in silence and dream of lettres de cachet, confiscations, and imprisonments, offering up their fervent prayers to the throne of grace, to prosper your righteous cause, which alone will free us from those jealous fears and apprehensions that rob us of our peace."9
In anticipation of their arrival, Major-General Schuyler drafted correspondence informing the Canadian population of his intentions:
. . . the Grand Congress have ordered an Army into Canada, to expel from thence, if possible, those British Troops, which, now acting under the orders of a despotic Ministry, would wish to enslave your countrymen. This measure, necessary as it is, the Congress would not have entered on, but in the fullest confidence that it would be perfectly agreeable to you10
Certainly this attitude was reflected, even in private, amongst those who would design and execute the invasion of Canada. In confiding to Brigadier Wooster, Schuyler was quite adamant that "We are soldiers ambitious only to aid in restoring the violated rights of citizens . . . Liberty, Safety and Peace are our objects --- the establishment of the Constitution and not the lust of dominion".11 As benevolent as they might have appeared, however, these sentiments were not shared by everyone involved in that campaign. Colonel Ethan Allen, who was known more for his many excesses than his military prowess, suggested a more sinister motive: that "we should have little to fear from the Canadians and Indians and would easily make a conquest of that place and set up a standard of liberty in the extensive Province of Quebeck".12 Certainly, there were more reasonable men who thought that the American campaign may not have been necessary. Historian Brantz Mayer, for instance, stated in his introduction of Charles Carroll's journal that,
The expediton that was sent to the north was deemed, by some persons, of questionable policy, and not a few of our people thought it entirely subversive of the principles upon which we grounded our resistence. It ought naturally, they alleged, be regarded as a war of conquest, and, as such, was entirely at variance with the spirit of our discontent.13
In spite of these exceptions, and his own military confidence, Washington knew that their expedition hinged upon the perceptions of the Quebec population, "ever bearing in Mind, that if they are averse to it and will not co-operate, or at least willingly acquiesce, it must fail of success."14 By appealing to their emotive instincts, he hoped to focus whatever popular support might have been building in Canada towards revolution against the ruling elite. If, as a consequence, his generals could enlist a number of French Canadian troops to their cause, so much the better. What concerned him most, however, was the possibility that "a sudden Incursion might alarm the Canadians and detach them from that Neutrality which they have hitherto observed".15 Certainly, he could not afford to offend the Canadians, and drive them into British arms.
Despite the numerous delays in assembling troops, and awaiting provisions, Congresses plans for invasion were ambitious, calling for a two pronged attack. While Montgomery would proceed through the Richelieu Valley and engage the bulk of Carleton's troops somewhere between Montreal and Quebec, Brigadier Arnold would lead a smaller force through the Kennebec region of Maine in an attempt to seize Quebec by surprise.
Having taken Fort Ticonderoga without even a single shot being fired, the resistance provided by Brigadier Montgomery's second major objective was to be commended, if not entirely anticipated. Once alerted to the American invasion, Carleton's decision in September to station the bulk of his regular troops at Fort St. Jean was entirely strategic in nature, designed to buy him some time while he fortified Quebec's interior. Unable to induce but a few Canadians into his camp, Montgomery was indeed fortunate that Carleton's own attempt to recruit a militia in support of St. Jean had failed miserably: "The Canadians w'd not march, a very inconsiderable number excepted, notwithstanding every effort has been tryed, and every argument used by the clergy".16
Such indifference did not go unnoticed by the Americans either. Despite having defeated almost four-fifths of Carleton's standing army when St. Jean was capitulated in early November, and seizing Montreal without a fight only two weeks later, the reluctance of most Canadians to envelop themselves in their cause posed an interesting dilemna for Montgomery. Whereas he had expected support to gain momentum the further his army pushed into Quebec, Montgomery discovered that, excepting his friends in Montreal, the Canadians still looked upon the British as their protectors and the Quebec Act as their guarantee of cultural rights. Perhaps Colonel Allen's premature raid on Montreal and subsequent capture in late September had reawakened the habitants to the limitations of the American position. More likely, the inevitable dispatch of "ten or twelve thousand men here, early next spring, completely equipped" had convinced the Canadians that whatever successes the Americans might have achieved early in the conflict would eventually be reversed.17 Whatever the reason, it was obvious, at least from the American perspective, that the Canadians were motivated by an entirely different set of priorities -- economy rather than politics, preservation of culture rather than military alliance -- leading Montgomery to conclude that "The Canadians will be our friends as long as we are able to maintain our ground . . . but they must not be depended upon".18
As long as the they could pay for their victuals with hard currency, and treated the habitants with due courteously, they were accepted wherever they traveled. Yet, as welcome as they might have been, the issue of cash payment for local purchases had only been incidental to the whole operation, and not necessarily the point of it. Washington's orders had been issued as a matter of diplomacy, rather than necessity: "You will be particularly careful to pay the full value for all provisions, or other accommodations, which the Canadians may provide for you on your march."19 Could a new strategy have been devised, then, to take full advantage of this development?
Certainly, an economic model held some appeal, but, discounting their own untimely shortage of currency, the Americans seem to have been undermined by outside forces. They placed a good deal of trust in the intelligence provided by men such as Walker, James Price and Joseph Binden. All were English Protestant merchants who favored an expansion of their own enterprise but were seriously curtailed by the limitations imposed upon them by the Quebec Act. What the Americans did not realize was that, although these merchants might have controlled most of the commercial trading in Canada, they themselves had seriously misjudged both their degree of influence over the French population, who held them in utter contempt, and the effectiveness of both the clergy and seigneurs to maintain a hold on their authority. In their haste to support the Americans, these merchants ultimately doomed their own agenda to failure, as well as any hope of an American economic model for Quebec.
Without popular support and an alternative strategy to fall back upon, General Montgomery had every intention of wintering in Montreal and awaiting fresh supply of troops and material. Despite having achieved Congresses objective -- to prevent the British from using Canada as an avenue for the invasion of the rebel colonies -- his inability to capture Carleton at Montreal, however, and General Arnold's unexpected appearance at the mouth of the Chaudière River meant that their costly offensive would have to be maintained, if only to prevent Arnold's exhausted forces from being captured.20 A combined attempt to seize the fortress at Quebec on New Years Eve day, 1775 was at best a desparate manouver to reverse their declining fortunes. Unfortunately, it cost the Americans over a quarter of their army to capture or death, including their senior commander in the field, General Montgomery. Schuyler's army was self-disintegrating.
Certainly, the new year did not offer any encouraging prospects for those soldiers who remained in the field. Arnold, who was badly wounded in the assault, was forced to resign his command in favor of Brigadier Wooster, who faired no better in seizing Quebec, and in many ways accelerated the decline in American morale and Canadian support for their invasion. His incessant criticism of the Catholic church, and refusal to exchange Continental script for hard currency sponsored a good deal of antagonism. With enlistments on the verge of expiration, and few new recruits to take their place, beatings and robberies were not uncommon as Continental troops increasingly demonstrated their frustration with both the British and their own commanders upon the lowly Canadian population. In a display of unusually brilliant insight, the much propagated Qu‚bec Gazette foresaw many of the changes in attitude and behaviour that would eventually take place:
These people to whom you have done no harm come into your province to take your property with arms in their hands under a pretext of being your well-wishers. Can you think that these people who are without food and ammunition will allow you to enjoy peacefully the fruits of your labours, no; they will take your grain, your cattle and everything you have.21
In a last ditch attempt to reverse their fortunes, Congress formed a three man commission in the spring of 1776 to observe the activities of the American forces in Canada, and to do everything in their power to promote a union between the colonies and Quebec. Unfortunately, there was little they could do or recommend that would have improved their plight. So precarious was their state of occupation that Republican Charles Carroll had no choice but to conclude that,
The general apprehension that we shall be driven out of the Province as soon as the King's troops can arrive, concurs with the frequent breaches of promise the inhabitants have experienced . . . who suffered us to enter their country as friends, that the most urgent necessity can scarce excuse, since it has contributed much to the changing their good disposition towards us to enmity, and makes them wish our departure.22
With the arrival of the first vessels from Britain on May 5th, and the bulk of General Burgoyne's army in June, the Americans had no choice but to quit Canada for the relative safety of Albany, their mission thus ending in failure.
Despite the many assurances of the Protestant establishment, Quebec was not the hotbed of revolution that America was led to believe. As Carleton himself initially observed, "The Canadians have testified to me the strongest marks of Joy, and Gratitude, and Fidelity to the King, and to His government, for the late Arrangements made at Home in their Favor".23 While this may have been true of the noblesse, the attitude of the general population was slightly more varied. Some, such as the Montreal merchants, saw the Quebec Act as a direct attack upon their sociopolitical and economic status, however the vast majority of Canadians either voiced no opinion or were patiently acquiescent.
Despite having anticipated this reaction, Carleton was incorrect to assume that this silent majority was pro-British. Many habitants could only guess as to the reasoning which motivated the terms of the Quebec Act. While the Act may have confirmed "the practice of our laws, the free exercise of our religion, and the privileges and advantages of British subjects", as Neatby correctly points out, such liberties had already been taken for granted in accordance with both the rules of the capitulation of Quebec and Montreal in 1759 and as common practice under the administrations of both Murray and Carleton.24 What alarmed most habitants, then, was the fact that the Act served to entrench the powers of the ruling elite by re-establishing both the tithe and seigneural system of land ownership:
We have enjoyed very valuable privileges, since we became subjects of Great Britain; We had the Royal Promise for the continuance of that enjoyment. On a sudden, without our having done any thing to merit such treatment, we are deprived of those inestimable privileges, and reduced to our former state of slavery.25
Of course, the Americans had suspected all along that the Quebec Act was contrived as much as a guarantor of Canadian cultural rights as a defence against the very threat that had befallen the southern colonies. The British, for instance, needed a loyal partner in the noblesse to reduce the Canadians "to that state of Deference and Obedience, which they formerly paid their ancient Government", and so contain the potential spark in Canada that had already ignited the American cause.26 Similarly, the clergy and seigneurs required an ally in the British to counter the growing seed of democracy which was then being advocated by the Montreal merchant class, and to maintain their own position of authority within the Canadian community.27
Whether perceived by the general population as a re-establishment of the ancienne regime, or a defence against the encroachment of democracy, few could claim ignorance as to where they stood. If the Act served to solidify the role of the clergy and seigneur within the constitutional system of government, so too did it finally guarantee the "continuance of our ancient laws, customs, and privileges", in short everything that the Canadian population had been striving for since the treaty of 1763.28 Had there been no American invasion to test Canadian loyalty, there would have been no question of their support, as tacit as it might have been, nor reason for them to weigh culture against cost. Yet, with armed conflict so close to the horizon, and so many opposing points of view, one could not help but question if the Americans might do better:
The people, whom we are desired to regard as enemies, tell us, they are our real friends; and they give us convincing proofs of their sincerity. They are now in arms for our defence from our oppressors; and they make the repeal of the Quebec Bill one of the conditions on which they offer to lay them down. Which party then ought we to assist?29
As with many of his actions, Carleton's proclamation of June 9, 1775, which called for the raising of a Canadian militia, met with obvious disappointment. Had he not appointed the seigneurs to lead these local units but the militia Captains themselves, in whose experience these affairs had been traditionally entrusted, perhaps Carleton might have been able to entice greater habitant participation in the defence of Fort St. Jean. Without reinforcments, however, Carleton was left no choice but to abandon the entire Richelieu Valley, including Montreal, to Montgomery's army. Even when a minor victory such as Colonel Allen's capture might have turned Canadian sentiment in favor of the British, Carleton's refusal to pursue his accomplices served only to reinforce the Canadian view that he was incapable of dealing with the Americans.
From Carleton's perspective, however, his attitude was no different from that of the noblesse, whom he trusted and relied upon to keep the habitant population in check. If blame was to be laid for the advancement of the Americans into Quebec, it rested not upon their shoulders, but with the Canadians: "we have so many Enemies within, and foolish people. Dupes to those Traitors, with the natural Fears of Men unused to war, I think our Fate extremely doubtful, to say nothing worse."30 Their hesitancy in supporting Carleton, then, was no mere coincidence. The more he looked upon these lower classes as 'Dupes' and servants, the more they looked upon Carleton as being in the same class as the clergy and seigneurs, the greater their resultant alienation from the British position. Such mutually reinforcing attitudes had already resulted in critical consequences for both parties.
He could take some consolation in the fact that the American appeal for support, much to their own disappointment, was greeted with an almost equal lack of enthusiasm. No doubt the Americans had overlooked the several thousands on both sides who perished during their last colonial meeting, or expected a common quarrel with Britain to overshadow their own differences in culture, religion, and language. Though simple in their ways, many habitants would not forget having being addressed by Congress as being impious, bigots and murders.31
Such animosity had existed almost from the start of their colonial foundation. As British and French regulars contested their imperial will on the Plains of Abraham, so too were the colonials encouraged to engage in open hostility. While conducted on a much smaller scale, their battles had equally compelling results. These petits guerres were generally intense, fearful, and quite personal. Attacks by one side naturally provoked retaliatory strikes that continued long after the war on the battlefield had been lost or won.
With not even a generation having passed since the end of the Seven Years War, few could have imagined that French and English colonials might form a political or military alliance, no less an amicable and satisfactory reconciliation of their many differences. Self control, then, was not so much a matter of putting asside these differences as it was of ignoring the obvious in an effort to achieve their singular objectives. That the Americans should place so great an emphasis on appeasing the Canadians, and that the Canadians would be so tolerant of an American incursion into their territory is in itself a clear indication that both sides were weary of where the present conflict might lead to if some sort of concensus could not be reached.
Political rhetoric asside, the Canadians could not be expected to support an American invasion without a clear understanding of what the democratic movement represented, and a concise determination of its durability. While the idea of democracy certainly had an emotive appeal, few outside the noblesse could fully comprehend the implications of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations or the political solicitudes of such notables as John Jay and Colonel John Brown, no less embrace them as something potentially rivaling the Quebec Act. While a declaration of independence might have convinced some to join the revolutionary cause, to think that America would have taken Canada with relative ease "Had this decisive Measure been taken nine months earlier" is to presume too much of the Canadians, who might have settled for far less autonomy than their ambitious neighbors, but greater control of their own uniqueness on the North American continent.32 But for democracy, then, what could the Americans offer Quebec that the British had not already granted in kind?
Perhaps some form of self determination might have beckoned Quebec to ally with the Americans, but there were many matters of impracticality that had to be dealt with first. Of primary importance was their ability to maintain their choice of government once achieved. Raised so devoutly in the mercantile mold, Quebec, considered a wealth of natural resources, had become undeniably dependent upon France for military, economic, and administrative support. Such dependence was not limited to only logistical support, but was as much psychological in nature, ingrained upon the social psyche of the colony by a dominant and omnipresent mother country. They could not speak for fear that their words might be used against them. They could not act without fearing that their actions might result in a loss of their rights and privileges. It was a relatively simple process, then, for the British to assume dominance of the province after the Conquest, for the way had already been cleared before them by the French. As long as Quebec held mere colonial status, they would have been at the mercy of any nation, including the Americans and French, which saw fit to occupy it.
To declare political autonomy and forego a protector would have been an unrealistic expectation to say the least, for if Quebec were to embrace such feelings as what affected the American colonies, could anyone shelter them against the inevitable British backlash? The Americans, quite simply, were not perceived as a military threat to opposing British forces. Although sincere in motive, their numerous deficiencies were reason enough to question their resilience. Even the Protestant merchants, so many of whom supported and openly aided the invasion at its onset, were to become convinced that the Americans would be no match for the British, and began to shift their allegiance accordingly.33 Without any other protector to rely upon, prudence demanded that the Canadians take a cautious approach to enlistment with the rebels.
Even if Washington's intentions were as benevolent as he stated, could the actions of his army be taken on faith alone? Despite his personal appeals to Montgomery and Schuyler that they take a conciliatory attitude towards the French and keep their troops under close scrutiny, their increasingly ill treatment of the Canadians made what few words might have backed up their actions seem suspect.34 As long as specie flowed freely from American hands to Canadian and there was a posibility that they might prevail against the British, such behaviour could be tolerated. Once funds were depleted, and few would accept their notes or promises, the Americans must have realized that their days in Canada were numbered. Such ignorance in dealing with the Canadians made what few ideological victories they did achieve appear inconsequential. The election in February, 1776 of civic representatives to Congress, for instance, although looked upon favorably by the general population, was underscored by the fact that the results would not ever be enforced.35
Of course, the arrival of Burgoyne's advance party in May made any question of joining the rebel cause quite moot. Yet, while Carleton no longer need have concerned himself with finding sufficient troops to repel the Americans, the taint of their neutrality was to follow them for quite some time: "I think there is nothing to fear from them while we are in a state of prosperity, and nothing to hope for while in distress."36 Such feelings may have clouded his own judgment with regard to colonial affairs in Quebec. If the Canadian population could not be trusted during an American invasion, what would their feelings be if a French fleet suddenly appeared over the horizon? In having committed himself and his troops to a strategy of defence for the remainder of the war, Carleton's reply was quite obvious.
For all intents and purposes, an alliance between America and Quebec was completely unworkable. While there was certainly a potential for some form of economic or political union, their shared preoccupation with Britain's response created a serious impediment to how they would eventually respond to each other. On the one hand, neither could afford to lose the support of the other, for fear that it would lessen their own chances of gaining an advantage over their common foe. On the other hand, their abject differences prevented neither from committing themselves to a broader support of the other's needs and demands. While the Americans saw little need to cater to Quebec's cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, Quebec saw virtually no benefit in becoming involved in what was essentially an English conflict. In the end, neither America nor Quebec expected much from the other, and got exactly what they expected.
While America's failure to win over Quebec did not severely alter its revolutionary destiny, it did serve to dramatically shape the direction of British North American policy for the next one hundred years, especially with regard to the French Canadians. Perhaps in partial retaliation for their weak support, Britain would attempt to dilute the effects of the Quebec Act. Such later measures as the the Constitution Act of 1791, which effectively repealed all terms of the Quebec Act that dealt with government but left intact those which dealt with the Church, granted increasingly greater power to Anglo-Loyalist interests at the expense of the French Canadian element.37 Even the seigneurs, who had amply demonstrated their loyalty during the revolution, were not immune to the changes brought on by these measures. In fact, because of what they had come to expect from the British as a loyal partner in government, they were even more likely to be at risk by the introduction of an elected assemby and the future granting of all crown lands in freehold tenure.38
The movement of Brish colonial policy away from conciliation, however, did not seriously alter the resolution of the Canadian people to maintain their unique place within North American culture, and may have only served to reinforce it. A further investigation of British expectations during the American invasion, which has not been fully addressed in the course of this essay, might certainly offer a better understanding of the development of the post-Revolutionary relationship between Quebec and Britain.
1 Henri Têtu, Evêques de Quèbec (Quebec: N.S. Hardy, 1889), p. 326: Briand's mandement of May 22, 1775. Cited in George Rawlyk, Revolution Rejected 1775-1776 (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 63.
2 Alfred Leroy Burt, The Old Province of Quebec (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1933), Chap. X, pp. 202-247.
3 Fernand Ouellet, Histoire économic et sociale du Qu‚bec 1760-1850 (Montréal: Fides, 1966), Chap. IV, pp. 99-124.
4 Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The Revolutionary Age 1760-1791 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1966), Chap. 10, pp. 142-155.
5 National Archives of Canada, Q, XI, p.184. Cited in Robert McConnell Hatch, Thrust For Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec in 1775-1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), p. 33.
6 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1931), Vol. III, p. 479: Washington to the Inhabitants of Canada, September 7, 1775.
7 A.L. Burt, Old Province, p. 229.
8 Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, (Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1820-1821), Vol. I, pp. 19-20. Cited in A.L. Burt, Old Province, pp. 47-48; An earlier raid on Fort St. Jean had been explained by the New York Provincial Congress as a precautionary measure to "prevent hostile incursions upon us by the Troops in your Province". Jared Sparks Manuscripts, Houghton Library, Harvard University, XXIX, pp 284-85. Cited in R.M. Hatch, Thrust, p. 33.
9 Journal of the Massachussetts Provincial Congress, 1775, pp. 751-752. Cited in R.M. Hatch, Thrust, p. 33.
10 Library of Congress, Peter Force Collection, 4, III, pp. 671-672: Philip Schuyler to the Inhabitants of Canada, September 5, 1775. Cited in George A. Rawlyk, Revolution Rejected 1775-1776 (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 56.
11 New York Public Library, Philip Schulyer Papers: Schuyler to Wooster, July 13, 1775. Cited in R.M. Hatch, Thrust, p. 34.
12 Library of Congress, Peter Force Collection, 4, II, p. 733. Cited in R.M. Hatch, Thrust, p. 29.
13 Brantz Mayer, ed., Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton During His Visit to Canada in 1776, As One of The Commissioners From Congress (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1876), p. 10.
14 J.C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, Vol. III, p. 493: Washington to Arnold, September 14, 1775.
15 J.C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, Vol. III, pp. 438: Washington to Schuyler, August 20, 1775.
16 Ernest Cruikshank, ed., A History of the Organization, Development and Services of the Military and Naval Forces of Canada from the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the Present Time (Ottawa), p. 79: Carleton to Lord Dartmouth, September 21, 1775. Cited in George F. G. Stanley, Canada Invaded 1775-1776 (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), p. 46.
17 Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918), Vol. I, p. 663: Dartmouth to Carleton, June 7, 1775.
18 Library of Congress, Peter Force Collection, 4, IV, p. 188: Montgomery to Continental Congress, December 4, 1775. Cited in R.M. Hatch, Thrust, p. 146.
19 J.C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, Vol. III, p. 495: Washington to Arnold, September 14, 1775.
20 Burt, Old Province, p. 223.
21 Quèbec Gazette, October 5, 1775.
22 Kate M. Rowland, The Life of Charles Carrroll of Carrollton (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1898), I, pp.154. Cited in G.A. Rawlyk, Revolution Rejected, p. 62.
23 A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty, Documents, Vol. II, p. 584: Carleton to Gage, September 20, 1774.
24 Quote from Henri Têtu and C.O. Gagnon, eds., Mandements, Lettres Pastorales et Circulaires des Evˆsques de Qu‚bec, (Qu‚bec, 1888), II, pp. 264-5: Briand's mandement of May 22, 1775. Cited in Mason Wade, French Canadians (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1968), Vol. I, p. 68; H. Neatby, Quebec, p. 145.
25 Francis Masères, "A Narrative of the tumultuous Conduct of the freeholders of divers seigniories in the province of Quebeck", Additional Papers Concerning the Province of Quebeck (London: Horace's Head, 1776), p. 78-79.
26 A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty, Documents, p. 677: Carleton to Germain, May 9, 1777.
27 M. Wade, French Canadians, Vol. I, p. 57; F. Ouellet, Histoire économic, p. 118. Ouellet argues convincingly that the relationship between the British and the noblesse went far beyond mere conquerer and conquered. Theirs was a concerted effort to maintain the integrity of Canadian gentility.
28 A. Shortt and A.G. Dougherty, Documents, p. 510: Memorial of French Subjects in Support of their Petition, December, 1773.
29 F. Masères, Additional Papers, pp 78-79.
30 Cited in G.F.G. Stanley, Canada Invaded, p. 70: Carleton to Dartmouth, November 20, 1775.
31 C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), Vol. I, p. 88. Cited in M. Wade, French Canadians, p. 65.
32 Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), Vol. III, p. 297: Samuel Adams to R.H. Lee, July 15, 1776.
33 H. Neatby, Quebec, pp. 149-150.
34 J.C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, Vol. III, pp. 485-486: Washington to Schuyler, September 8, 1775; pp. 491-496: Washington to Arnold, September 14, 1775. These are but two examples of Washington's careful instructions regarding their conduct towards the Canadians.
35 M. Wade, French Canadians, pp. 70-71.
36 National Archives of Canada, Q, 12, p. 188: Carleton to Germain, September 28, 1776. Cited in M. Wade, French Canadians, p. 69.
37 A. Shortt and A.G. Dougherty, Documents, p. 775: Petition of Sir John Johnson and Loyalists, April 11, 1785. Although many petitions were recieved by London regarding the plight of American Loyalists, this one in particular raises many of the concerns that would later have a bearing upon the French Canadian population: ". . . they possess the greatest Confidence, that by Your Majesty's Gracious Interposition they will be exempted from the Burthens of French Tenures, which, however congenial they may be to Men born and bred under them, would be in the highest Degree exceptionable to Englishmen."